1. Is Ghana Really Approaching a “Failed State”?

Professor Bokpin’s warning that infrastructure deficits and power challenges risk pushing Ghana towards a “failed state” reflects a legitimate concern.

However, this characterisation may exaggerate the severity of Ghana’s current economic and institutional conditions.

A failed state is generally defined by the collapse of governmental authority, inability to provide basic services, widespread insecurity and macroeconomic breakdown. In contrast, Ghana’s current trajectory demonstrates declining inflation, ongoing fiscal consolidation, strengthened reserves and debt restructuring programmes that have improved medium-term sustainability.

Furthermore, Ghana maintains democratic stability, attracts foreign investment and implements significant structural reforms.

Although challenges persist, substantial economic difficulties should not be equated with state failure. A more precise assessment is that Ghana faces development and productivity challenges rather than an existential institutional crisis.

2. Does Macroeconomic Stability Matter Less Than Transformation?

Professor Bokpin accurately observes that macroeconomic stability alone does not constitute economic transformation.

However, transformation is unlikely to occur in the absence of stability.

Historical evidence indicates that successful economies first establish macroeconomic foundations before achieving large-scale industrialisation and structural change.

Investors are generally unwilling to commit long-term capital when inflation is unstable, exchange rates are volatile and fiscal deficits are uncontrolled.

The relationship between stability and transformation is therefore complementary rather than contradictory.

While lower inflation, improved reserves and debt sustainability do not guarantee prosperity, they establish the conditions necessary for its achievement.

3. Is the Big Push a Debt Risk or a Growth Strategy?

Critics contend that large infrastructure programmes may recreate the debt accumulation problems observed under previous administrations.

However, the cost of underinvestment can sometimes surpass the cost of investment.

Poor road infrastructure increases transportation costs, raises food prices, reduces competitiveness and discourages industrial activity.

The central question is not whether Ghana should invest, but whether such investments are commercially, economically and fiscally viable.

4. Is the 24-Hour Economy Premature?

Professor Bokpin’s criticism presumes that a reliable power system must precede the establishment of a 24-hour economy.

Alternatively, increased economic activity can justify and finance improvements in energy infrastructure.

By promoting continuous operations in manufacturing, logistics, agro-processing, healthcare, transport and digital services, a 24-hour economy can create commercial incentives for new investments in generation, transmission and distribution systems.

In this framework, the policy is not contingent upon a perfect energy supply but can serve as a mechanism for generating the economic activity required to support future energy investments.

5. Is the 24-Hour Economy Authority an Unnecessary Bureaucracy?

Professor Bokpin has characterised the proposed Authority as duplicative.

However, economic transformation programmes frequently fail because no single institution is responsible for coordination.

Implementing a 24-hour economy involves multiple sectors, including energy, transport, labour, taxation, security, trade, customs, manufacturing and local government.

Existing ministries tend to prioritise their own sectoral mandates.

A central coordinating institution can reduce fragmentation and enhance accountability.

6. Is Revenue Mobilisation Merely Another Form of Taxation?

Professor Bokpin has consistently cautioned against using taxation as a punitive measure that undermines businesses.

The NDC’s approach, however, can be interpreted as focusing on broadening the tax base, digitalising collections, reducing leakages and improving compliance rather than merely increasing rates.

In this context, the government seeks to collect more revenue from previously untaxed economic activities while alleviating pressure on compliant businesses.

The central policy debate should therefore address how revenue is raised and whether the tax burden is distributed equitably across the economy.

7. Does Economic Data Reflect Real Improvements?

One of Professor Bokpin’s most compelling arguments is that citizens assess economic performance based on their daily experiences rather than statistical indicators.

While this perspective is valid, improvements in living standards often lag behind macroeconomic gains.

For example, reductions in inflation may take several months to translate into significant increases in household purchasing power. Fiscal stabilisation may also occur before job creation, rather than simultaneously.

Therefore, the absence of immediate household-level improvements should not be interpreted as evidence of policy failure.

A more appropriate assessment is whether current policies are establishing the conditions necessary for future job creation, productivity growth and income expansion.

8. Monetary Easing, Credit Expansion and the Path to Shared Prosperity

Professor Bokpin correctly asserts that economic statistics must ultimately result in improved living standards, stronger businesses and quality employment.

However, economic recovery is an ongoing process with identifiable transmission channels.

In most economies, macroeconomic improvements initially manifest in indicators such as inflation, foreign reserves, fiscal balances, policy rates and lending conditions before translating into business expansion, employment creation and household welfare.

The recent decline in inflation has enabled the Bank of Ghana to initiate a gradual monetary easing cycle.

As policy rates decrease, commercial banks experience lower funding costs and can reduce lending rates to businesses and households.

Lower interest rates are particularly significant because Ghanaian businesses have long identified high borrowing costs as a major barrier to expansion.

Reduced financing costs can encourage firms to invest in machinery, expand production lines, purchase inventory, open new branches and hire additional workers.

Increased credit availability is also essential. Recent trends in the banking sector indicate a renewed willingness among financial institutions to extend credit to the private sector following improvements in macroeconomic stability and confidence.

The sequence is therefore:

Macroeconomic stability → lower inflation → lower policy rates → reduced lending rates → increased private-sector borrowing → business expansion → job creation → higher household incomes and improved living standards.

Critics who demand immediate improvements in living conditions are reflecting public sentiment. However, the effects of monetary easing and increased credit supply are subject to time lags.

Businesses generally require time to adjust investment plans, expand operations and hire additional workers before households experience the resulting benefits.

While it is reasonable to question whether citizens are experiencing the full benefits of stabilisation, it is premature to conclude that the recovery has failed solely because the transmission from macroeconomic gains to household welfare is incomplete.

Falling inflation, declining interest rates, stronger bank balance sheets, expanding credit to productive sectors and improving investor confidence provide a foundation for business growth.

If sustained, these developments should gradually result in increased production, higher-quality jobs, stronger household purchasing power and improved livelihoods.

Conclusion

Rather than dismissing Professor Bokpin’s concerns, policymakers should regard them as valuable tests of policy effectiveness.

Academic scepticism should be applied consistently to both risks and achievements. If government actions warrant scrutiny for their promises, they also merit recognition when measurable progress is achieved.

Equating Ghana to Sudan, Libya or Somalia is not a realistic statement in my view.

The most equitable assessment of Ghana’s economic trajectory is neither uncritical celebration nor excessive pessimism, but a balanced evaluation grounded in evidence, outcomes and the long-term realities of economic transformation.