Ghana has been here before. Gold made the country famous, but not rich enough. Oil promised transformation, but delivered restraint.

Lithium now presents itself not merely as another extractive resource, but as a gateway into the global green economy.

And once again, Ghana is debating not whether to extract, but how much power to surrender in the process.

This debate is not noise. It is the sound of a country testing whether it has learned.

What Was the Old Bill—and Why It Was Withdrawn

The withdrawn instrument was the Mining Lease Agreement between the Government of Ghana and Atlantic Lithium (Ghana) Ltd in respect of the Ewoyaa Lithium Project, laid before Parliament in 2023–2024 pursuant to Article 268(1) of the 1992 Constitution.

Article 268(1) is clear:

“Any transaction involving the grant of a right or concession for the exploitation of any mineral, water or other natural resource of Ghana shall be subject to ratification by Parliament.”

The Ewoyaa Mining Lease required a simple majority of Members present and voting. It never got there.

Why It Was Removed

The lease was withdrawn by the Executive, not rejected by Parliament.

The withdrawal followed sustained objections from civil society, policy analysts, and the Parliamentary Minority.

The core concern was not illegality, but value capture and timing: Ghana was being asked to ratify long-term terms before lithium’s global value curve had stabilised, and before the national consensus required for a strategic mineral had formed.

Withdrawal became the safer constitutional option. It preserved executive discretion—but it also acknowledged that the public confidence threshold had not been met.

What Is the New Instrument—and Why the Government Changed Strategy

The new framework is the Minerals and Mining (Royalty) Regulations, 2025, a Legislative Instrument (L.I.) made under Section 25 of the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703).

Instead of fixing royalties within a project-specific lease, the government proposes a sliding-scale royalty regime applicable across minerals, including lithium.

Under the new L.I.:

Lithium royalties start at 7% at current prices.

Royalties can rise to 12% as global prices increase.

A 1% Community Development Fund is created for host communities.

The framework applies generally, not selectively.

Legally, this shifts the battleground:

From Article 268 ratification politics, where Parliament can block a specific concession

To subsidiary legislation, subject to parliamentary scrutiny but not structured around a single project vote

From the government’s perspective, this creates predictability.

From the critics’ perspective, it reduces Parliament’s leverage.

Both readings are constitutionally plausible.

The Constitutional Tension: Who Is Right?

This is not merely a policy disagreement. It is a dispute about fiduciary duty.

Government’s Constitutional Argument

Parliament retains oversight through:

L.I. review powers

Budget approval

Future lease ratifications

The Constitution does not dictate the precise mechanism of value capture—only that concessions require parliamentary ratification. A general royalty regime, the government argues, avoids case-by-case politicisation and makes the fiscal environment more legible to investors.

Minority & Civil Society Argument

Article 257(6) vests minerals in the President in trust for the people of Ghana.

Trust implies maximisation of long-term national benefit—not merely revenue certainty and administrative efficiency. Parliament’s ratification role is substantive, not ceremonial. And strategic minerals demand heightened scrutiny, not a process that appears to streamline around dissent.

This is not only legal. It is moral governance—and the public can sense that.

The Scandal Question: When Trust Becomes the Crisis

There is no judicial finding of corruption in Ghana’s lithium process. But resource governance does not collapse only through theft. It collapses through opacity and contradiction.

The controversy escalated because the dispute ceased to be solely about percentages and became about credibility.

The Minority’s claim is simple and politically potent: if Parliament were given firm assurances that consultations and requirements were satisfied, then a later withdrawal citing insufficient consultation creates a contradiction that Parliament has a right to interrogate.

The Government answers with its own equally simple claim: a willingness to pause, consult, and strengthen terms is not flip-flopping—it is democratic responsiveness.

Both arguments can be true at once.

That is what makes this moment dangerous.

In extractives, perception is not cosmetic—it is consequential. When citizens cannot see the underlying fiscal logic, they question not just the math, but the motive.

The risk is not merely scandal; it is a trust deficit that damages Ghana’s negotiating power and investor credibility simultaneously.

The Money Question: Why Margins Matter More Than Headlines

At its 2022 peak, lithium traded above US$70,000 per tonne. Prices have since fallen dramatically, but volatility does not negate value; it increases the need for strong fiscal design.

Over the life of Ewoyaa:

Gross resource value runs into billions of dollars.

A 1–2% royalty difference can translate into hundreds of millions foregone.

Early concessions create opportunity costs that are hard to reverse without reputational and legal risk.

The fear is not today’s price. It is tomorrow’s boom—and whether Ghana’s framework is built to capture it.

Global Context Ghana Cannot Ignore

Lithium is increasingly treated as:

an industrial policy tool

a geopolitical asset

a national security input

Countries that moved early are recalibrating:

Chile increased state participation.

Australia tightened fiscal terms.

Argentina has faced public pressure to revise regimes.

Ghana is being judged against this evolving global standard. In a world racing to secure supply chains, the country that negotiates wisely can move from extraction to influence.

The Gold Lesson—and Why It Matters Here

Gold is Ghana’s cautionary tale. Ghana tightened control over gold only after decades of lost value—and at the cost, some argue, of squeezing out legally compliant exporters under new centralised frameworks.

Gold taught a lesson too late: control without early leverage limits upside.

Lithium is still early.

That is precisely why the stakes feel higher. With lithium, Ghana still has the rare advantage of negotiating before the ecosystem fully locks in.

Why the Minority Is Still Not Satisfied

Their concern is not obstruction. It is path dependency.

Royalties alone do not build industrial capacity. Exporting raw spodumene risks repeating the gold model: high extraction, low transformation. Without binding commitments—especially on local processing—Ghana risks becoming a quarry in the electric age rather than a player in the battery economy.

These are not radical demands. They are strategic ones.

What Can Be Tweaked Without Blowing Up the Framework

Three adjustments could reconcile law, politics, and economics:

1. Statutory timelines for value addition

Tie processing milestones to licence renewal and compliance triggers.

2. Strengthened state equity governance

MIIF participation must translate into influence and accountability—not passive returns.

3. Radical transparency

Publish valuation assumptions, price triggers, and renegotiation clauses so debate is anchored in evidence, not suspicion.

None of these violate the Constitution. All of them strengthen trust.

The Bottom Line

Lithium will define the next industrial era. Ghana will not get a second first chance.

This debate is not about politics. It is about whether Ghana governs strategically—or administratively. History will not ask whether the law was followed. It will ask whether the law was used wisely.

And that is the question still hanging in the air.

---Amanda Clinton Esq., MSc. African Politics (SOAS), London