A new technical report presented to the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) has concluded that the programme has delivered substantial macroeconomic benefits to Ghana, far outweighing the reported trading losses of the Bank of Ghana (BoG).

The report, titled “Evaluating the Macroeconomic Effects of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod)”, was prepared by Prof. Festus Ebo Turkson and Peter Junior Dotse of the Department of Economics, University of Ghana, together with Prof. Agyapomaa Gyeke-Dako of the University of Ghana Business School.

It was dated January 4, 2026.

Using conservative assumptions and verifiable data, the authors assessed the impact of GoldBod on gold smuggling, foreign exchange inflows, and broader macroeconomic stability.

Sharp Reduction in Gold Smuggling

According to the report, GoldBod has significantly curtailed gold smuggling, particularly within the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector.

Recorded Artisanal Small-scale Mining(ASM) gold exports rose sharply from 63.6 tonnes in 2024 to 103.0 tonnes in 2025—an increase of 39.4 tonnes.

The authors argue that this additional volume largely represents gold that was previously smuggled out of the country but has now been formalised.

Valued conservatively at about US$96.5 million per tonne, the increase translates into approximately US$3.8 billion in additional foreign exchange entering Ghana’s formal financial system.

Benefits Far Outweigh BoG Trading Loss

The report directly compares these gains with the US$214 million trading loss reported by the BoG and cited by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

It finds that the benefits from reduced smuggling alone outweigh the reported loss by a factor of about 18 to one.

In practical terms, the report notes that formalising just 2.2 tonnes of gold exports would have been enough to offset the BoG’s reported loss, while the actual increase in formalised exports is nearly 18 times that threshold.

Major Savings From Non-Debt FX Inflows

The authors also highlight the financing advantages of GoldBod’s non-debt foreign exchange inflows.

ASM gold exports facilitated through GoldBod in 2025 amounted to an estimated US$10.8 billion.

They argue that if Ghana had sought to raise a similar amount through external borrowing, annual interest costs would have ranged between US$756 million and US$1.08 billion, assuming borrowing rates of 7–10 per cent.

Even focusing only on the likely reduction in smuggling, the report estimates avoided annual interest costs of between US$266 million and US$380 million.

Crucially, the report describes these savings as recurring annual benefits rather than one-off gains.

Wider Macroeconomic Impact

Beyond foreign exchange inflows, the report credits GoldBod with contributing to several broader macroeconomic improvements, including higher international reserves of about US$11–12 billion, exchange-rate stabilisation and appreciation relative to IMF projections, and a reduction in the domestic cost of servicing external debt, estimated at about GHS 6.2 billion.

It also points to a lower import bill valuation between January and October 2025—estimated at GHS 50.6 billion—and easing inflationary pressures through reduced exchange-rate pass-through.

Reframing the BoG “Loss”

The report argues that public debate around the BoG’s reported trading loss has been misconceived.

It explains that much of the loss reflects accounting translation effects rather than actual cash losses.

According to the authors, gold is purchased at near-retail exchange rates to discourage smuggling, while foreign exchange inflows are recorded at the lower interbank rate, creating accounting discrepancies.

The true economic cost of the programme—covering fees, purity losses, and offtake discounts—is estimated at about 2.5 per cent of the value of gold traded, far below headline loss figures.

Policy Recommendations

The report recommends that Ghana sustain price competitiveness to prevent a resurgence of smuggling, improve transparency in BoG reporting by clearly separating accounting effects from real economic costs, and gradually reduce policy costs as foreign exchange market conditions normalise.

It also calls for stronger governance and oversight, careful management of transition risks as GoldBod assumes greater trading responsibility, and continued fiscal discipline and law enforcement to deter smuggling.

The authors further suggest that the policy cost of GoldBod be treated as a quasi-fiscal expense and explicitly funded through the national budget.

A Stabilisation Tool, Not a Profit Centre

 

The report concludes that GoldBod should be viewed not as a profit-seeking trading entity but as a macroeconomic stabilisation and formalisation tool.

Based on available evidence, the authors describe it as a high-return policy intervention that has strengthened Ghana’s external position, reduced dependence on costly borrowing, and supported overall macroeconomic stability.